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Anonymity is a security property of paramount importance, as we move steadily towards a wired,
online community. Its import touches upon subjects as different as eGovernance, eBusiness and
eLeisure, as well as personal freedom of speech in authoritarian societies. Trust metrics are used in
anonymity networks to support and enhance reliability in the absence of verifiable identities, and a
variety of security attacks currently focus on degrading a user’s trustworthiness in the eyes of the
other users. In this paper, we analyse the privacy guarantees of the C anonymity protocol,
with and without onion forwarding, for standard and adaptive attacks against the trust level of
honest users.
1. Introduction
Protecting online privacy is an essential part of today’s society and its importance is increasingly
recognised as crucial in many fields of computer-aided human activity, such as eVoting, eAuc-
tions, bill payments, online betting and electronic communication. One of the most common
mechanisms for privacy is anonymity, which generally refers to the condition of being unidenti-
fiable within a given set of subjects, known as the anonymity set.
Many schemes have been proposed to enforce privacy through anonymity networks (e.g.
(Chaum, 1981; Jakobsson, 1999; Neff, 2001; Freedman and Morris, 2002; Nambiar and Wright,
2006)). Yet, the open nature of such networks and the unaccountability which results from the
very idea of anonymity, make the existing systems prone to various attacks (e.g. (Hopper et al.,
2010; McLachlan et al., 2009; Murdoch and Danezis, 2005; Dingledine et al., 2004)). An honest
user may have to suffer repeated misbehaviour (e.g., receiving infected files) without being able
to identify the malicious perpetrator. Keeping users anonymous also conceals their trustworthi-
ness, which in turn makes the information exchanged through system transactions untrustworthy
as well. Consequently, a considerable amount of research has recently been focussing on the de-
velopment of trust-and-reputation-based metrics aimed at enhancing the reliability of anonymity
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Fig. 1. Trust networks (Backes et al., 2010)
networks (Damiani et al., 2003; Damiani et al., 2002; Dingledine et al., 2001; Dingledine and
Syverson, 2002; Singh and Liu, 2003; Wang and Vassileva, 2003).
Developing an appropriate trust metric for anonymity is very challenging, due to the fact that
trust and anonymity are seemingly conflicting notions. Consider for instance the trust networks
of Figure 1. In (a) peer A trusts B and D, who both trust C. Assume now that C wants to request
a service from A anonymously, by proving her trustworthiness to A (i.e., the existence of a trust
link to it). If C can prove that she is trusted by D without revealing her identity (using e.g.
a zero-knowledge proof (Backes et al., 2010)), then A cannot distinguish whether the request
originated from C or E. Yet, A’s trust in D could be insufficient to obtain that specific service
from A. Therefore, C could strengthen her request by proving that she is trusted by both D
and B. This increases the trust guarantee. Unfortunately, it also decreases C’s anonymity, as A
can compute the intersection of peers trusted by both D and B, and therefore restrict the range
of possible identities for the request’s originator, or even identify C uniquely. Indeed, consider
Figure 1(b). Here the trust level between two principals is weighted, and trust between two non-
adjacent principals is computed by multiplying the values over link sequences in the obvious
way. Assume that the reliability constraint is that principal X can send (resp. receive) a message
to (from) principal Y if and only if her trust in Y is not lower than 60%. Principal E can therefore
only communicate through principal D. So, assuming that trust values are publicly known, E
cannot possibly keep her identity from D as soon as she tries to interact at all. These examples
document the existence of an inherent trade-off between anonymity and trust. The fundamental
challenge is to achieve an appropriate balance between practical privacy, and acceptable network
performance.
Community-based reputation systems are becoming increasingly popular both in the research
literature and in practical applications. They are systems designed to estimate the trustworthiness
of principals participating in some activity, as well as predict their future behaviour. Metrics for
trustworthiness are primarily based on peer-review, where peers can rate each other according
to the quality they experienced in their past mutual interactions (Krukow et al., 2008; ElSalam-
ouny et al., 2009a; ElSalamouny et al., 2009b). A good reputation indicates a peer’s good past
behaviour, and is reflected in a high trust value. Recent research in this domain has raised fun-
damental issues in the design of reputation management systems for anonymous networks. In
particular,
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1 what metrics are suitable for computing trust for a given application field?
2 how to ensure the integrity of the peers’ trust values, i.e., how to securely store and access
trust values against malicious peers?
3 how to ensure that honest users accurately rate other members?
The latter issue requires a mechanism to distinguish a user’s bad behaviour resulting from her
being under attack, from a deliberately malicious behaviour. This is a challenging and funda-
mental problem. Indeed, if we cannot accurately tell these two situations apart, malicious users
will target honest members in order to deteriorate their performance, and hence reduce other
members’ trust in them, while maintaining their apparent good behaviour. Thus, honest users
may in the long term end up enjoying very low trust levels, while attackers might see their repu-
tation increased, and so they increase their probability of being trusted by others. Over time this
will, of course, severely affect the system’s anonymity performance. Nevertheless, although a
considerable effort has recently been devoted to tackle the first two issues (Damiani et al., 2002;
Damiani et al., 2003; Singh and Liu, 2003), to the best of our knowledge the latter has been so
far relatively ignored.
In this paper we investigate the effect of attacks to the trust level of honest users on the security
of existing anonymity networks, such as the Reiter and Rubin’s C protocol (Reiter and
Rubin, 1998) and onion routing networks (Dingledine et al., 2004).
The C protocol allows Internet users to perform anonymous web transactions by sending
their messages through a random chain of users participating in the protocol. Each user in the
‘crowd’ must establish a path between her and a set of servers by selecting randomly some
users to act as routers (or forwarders). The formation of such routing paths is performed so
as to guarantee that users do not know whether their predecessors are message originators or
just forwarders. Each user only has access to messages routed through her. It is well known
that C cannot ensure strong anonymity in presence of corrupt participants (Reiter and
Rubin, 1998; Chatzikokolakis and Palamidessi, 2006), yet when the number of corrupt users
is sufficiently small, it provides a weaker notion of anonymity known as probable innocence.
Informally, a sender is probably innocent if to an attacker she is no more likely to be the message
originator than not to be.
Networks based on Onion Routing are distributed anonymising networks that use onion rout-
ing (Syverson et al., 1997) to provide anonymity to their users. Similarly to C, users choose
randomly a path through the network in which each node knows its predecessor and successor,
but no other node. The main difference with respect to C is that traffic flows through the
path in cells, which are created by the initiator by successively encrypting the message with the
session keys of the nodes in the path, in reverse order. Each node in the act of receiving the
message peels the topmost layer, discovers who the next node is, and then relays it forward. In
particular, only the last node can see the message in clear and learn its final destination.
In the paper we propose two variants of the congestion attacks in the literature, aimed at
deteriorating the trust level of target users in different extension of the C protocol. More
specifically, we first extend the protocol so that trust is used to inform the selection of forwarding
users. Our analysis of this extension shows that a DoS type attack targeting a user who initially
enjoys satisfactory anonymity protection, may threaten her privacy, as her trust level quickly
decreases over the time. We then extend the protocol further with a more advanced message
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forwarding technique, namely onion routing. While this extension offers much better protection
than the previous one, our analysis ultimately shows that it suffers from similar DoS attacks as
the others.
A second major contribution of this paper is the study of ‘adaptive’ attackers. Adaptive attacks
are carried out by malicious users who, rather than immediately reporting detected forwarders,
attempt to travel back along the anonymity chain (e.g., by successive brute-force attacks on its
nodes) so as to increase the probability that the node they eventually report (i.e., the first node
they fail to compromise) actually is the message originator.
Related work. Anonymity networks date back thirty years, to when Chaum introduced the con-
cept ofMix-net (Chaum, 1981) for anonymous communications, where different sources send en-
crypted messages to a mix which forwards them to their respective destinations. Various designs
(Syverson et al., 1997; Reiter and Rubin, 1998; Abe, 1998; Dingledine et al., 2004; Neff, 2001;
Ohkubo and Abe, 2000; Freedman and Morris, 2002; Nambiar and Wright, 2006; Rennhard and
Plattner, 2002) have since been proposed to improve Chaum’s mixes, e.g., by combinations of
artificial delays, variation in message ordering, encrypted message formats, message batching,
and random chaining of multiple mixes.
A variety of attacks (Back et al., 2001; Borisov et al., 2007; Hopper et al., 2010; Evans et al.,
2009; McLachlan and Hopper, 2008; McLachlan et al., 2009; Murdoch and Danezis, 2005; Pap-
pas et al., 2008; Dingledine et al., 2004) have since been discovered against such anonymity
systems. Those most related to the present work are the so-called congestion or clogging at-
tacks. In an congestion attack, the adversary monitors the flow through a node, builds paths
through other nodes, and tries to use all of their available capacity (Back et al., 2001). The idea
is that if the congested node belongs to the monitored path, the variation in the messages’ ar-
rival times will reflect at the monitored node. In (Murdoch and Danezis, 2005), Murdoch and
Danezis describe a congestion attack that may allow them to reveal all Tor’s routers (cf. (Din-
gledine et al., 2004)) involved in a path. However, although their attack works well against a Tor
network of a relatively small size, it fails against networks of typical sizes, counting nodes in
the thousands. More recently, Evans et al. (Evans et al., 2009) improved Murdoch and Danezis’s
attack so as to practically de-anonymise Tor’s users in currently deployed system. A similar at-
tack against MorphMix (Rennhard and Plattner, 2002) was recently described by Mclachlan and
Hopper (McLachlan and Hopper, 2008), proving wrong the previously held view that MorphMix
is robust against such attacks (Wiangsripanawan et al., 2007). Finally, a congestion attack is used
by Hopper et al. (Hopper et al., 2010) to estimate the latency between the source of a message
and its first relay in Tor. In loc. cit. the authors first use a congestion attack to identify the path,
and then create a parallel circuit throughout the same path to make their measurements.
Numerous denial of service (DoS) attacks have been reported in the literature. In particular,
the ‘packet spinning’ attack of (Pappas et al., 2008) tries to lure users into selecting malicious
relays by targeting honest users by DoS attacks. The attacker creates long circular paths involv-
ing honest users and sends large amount of data through the paths, forcing the users to employ
all their bandwidth and then timing out. These attacks motivate the demand for mechanisms to
enhance the reliability of anonymity networks. In recent years, a considerable amount of research
has been focusing on defining such mechanisms. In particular, trust-and-reputation-based met-
rics are quite popular in this domain (Backes et al., 2010; Damiani et al., 2003; Damiani et al.,
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2002; Dingledine et al., 2001; Dingledine and Syverson, 2002; Singh and Liu, 2003; Wang and
Vassileva, 2003). Enhancing the reliability by trust, not only does improve the system’s usability,
but may also increase its anonymity guarantee. Indeed, a trust-based selection of relays improves
both the reliability and the anonymity of the network, by delivering messages through ‘trusted’
routers. Moreover, the more reliable the system, the more it may attract users and hence improve
the anonymity guarantee by growing the anonymity set. Introducing trust in anonymity networks
does however open the flank to novel security attacks, as we prove in this paper.
In a recent paper of ours (Sassone et al., 2010a) we have analysed the anonymity provided by
C extended with some trust information, yet against a completely different threat model.
The two papers differ in several ways. Firstly, (Sassone et al., 2010a) considers a global and
‘credential-based’ trust notion, unlike the individual-and-reputation-based trust considered here.
Secondly, in (Sassone et al., 2010a) we considered an attack scenario where all protocol members
are honest but vulnerable to being corrupted by an external attacker. The global and fixed trust
in a user contrasts with the local and dynamic trust of this paper, as is meant to reflect the user’s
degree of resistance against corruption, that is the probability that the external attacker will fail
to corrupt her. The paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions to define a ‘social’ policy of
selecting relays nodes in order to achieve a given level of anonymity protection to all members
against such attackers, as well as a ‘rational’ policy maximise one’s own privacy.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organised as follows: in §2 we fix some basic notations
and recall the fundamental ideas of the C protocol and its properties, including the notion
of probable innocence. In §3 we present our first contribution: the C protocol extended
with trust information in the form of a forwarding policy of its participating members, and the
privacy properties of the resulting protocol are studied; §4 repeats the analysis for an extension
of the protocol with a more advanced forwarding technique inspired by onion routing. Finally, §5
introduces a new ‘adaptive’ attack scenario, and presents some preliminary results on its analysis,
both for the protocol with and without onion forwarding.
This paper is a full and extended version of (Sassone et al., 2010b), where the bulk of the
present results were first reported in succinct form. The analysis of adaptive attacks in loc. cit.
is however incomplete, in that it assumes that attackers who travel back over a path towards
its originator, need to corrupt each honest node each time they meet her. Arguably, this is not
so. Typically a node j will act according to a routing table, say T j. This will contain for each
path’s id a translation id and a forwarding address (either another user, or the destination server)
and, in the case of onion forwarding, the relevant encryption key. (Observe that since path’s id
are translated at each step, j may not be able to tell whether or not two entries in T j actually
correspond to a same path and, therefore, may not know how many times she occurs on each
path.) It is reasonable to assume that upon corruption an attacker c will seize T j, so that if she
ever reaches j again, c will find all the information to continue the attack just by inspecting T j.
This full exposition significantly improves the treatment of adaptive attackers in the general
case. A substantial amount of new work was devoted to §5, which indeed was extensively rewrit-
ten. More precisely, using the formal framework of (Sassone et al., 2010b), some ingenuity and
a lot of combinatorics, one can write an infinite series to compute the probability of success for
an adaptive attack, containing a term for each possible occurrence pattern of honest users and
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attackers in the path. The reason why this is sufficient, is that the only relevant factor in the com-
putation is how many times each honest user appears in between the attacker at the end of the
path and the detected node. Nothing in that, however, indicates how to simplify that series so as to
distill a usable formula. This is indeed the main step forward we make here with respect to (Sas-
sone et al., 2010b): by indexing our calculations on the set of users compromised by the adaptive
attack, we reach a final presentation for our analysis which we believe is sufficiently simple and
elegant. A further novelty with respect to loc. cit. is the quantitative comparison between the
probability of success of adaptive attacks versus standard ones at the end of §5.
2. C
In this section, we briefly revise the C protocol and the notion of probable innocence.
2.1. The protocol
C is a protocol proposed by Reiter and Rubin in (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) to allow Internet
users to perform anonymous web transactions by protecting their identities as originators of
messages. The central idea to ensure anonymity is that the originator forwards the message to
another, randomly-selected user, which in turn forwards the message to a third user, and so on
until the message reaches its destination (the end server). This routing process ensures that, even
when a user is detected sending a message, there is a substantial probability that she is simply
forwarding it on behalf of somebody else.
More specifically, a crowd consists of a fixed number of users participating in the protocol.
Some members (users) of the crowd may be corrupt (the attackers), and they collaborate in order
to discover the originator’s identity. The purpose of the protocol is to protect the identity of the
message originator from the attackers. When an originator –also known as initiator– wants to
communicate with a server, she creates a random path between herself and the server through
the crowd by the following process.
— Initial step: the initiator selects randomly a member of the crowd (possibly herself) and for-
wards the request to her. We refer to the latter user as the forwarder.
— Forwarding steps: a forwarder, upon receiving a request, flips a biased coin. With probability
1 − p f she delivers the request to the end server. With probability p f she selects randomly a
new forwarder (possibly herself) and forwards the request to her. The new forwarder repeats
the same forwarding process.
The response from the server to the originator follows the same path in the opposite direction.
Users (including corrupt users) are assumed to only have access to messages routed through
them, so that each user only knows the identities of her immediate predecessor and successor in
the path, as well as the server.
2.2. Probable innocence
Reiter and Rubin have proposed in (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) a hierarchy of anonymity notions
in the context of C. These range from ‘absolute privacy,’ where the attacker cannot per-
ceive the presence of an actual communication, to ‘provably exposed,’ where the attacker can
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prove a sender-and-receiver relationship. Clearly, as most protocols used in practice, C
cannot ensure absolute privacy in presence of attackers or corrupted users, but can only provide
weaker notions of anonymity. In particular, in (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) the authors propose an
anonymity notion called probable innocence and prove that, under some conditions on the pro-
tocol parameters, C ensures the probable innocence property to the originator. Informally,
they define it as follows:
A sender is probably innocent if, from the attacker’s
point of view, she appears no more likely to be the
originator than to not be the originator.
(1)
In other words, the attacker may have reason to suspect the sender of being more likely than any
other potential sender to be the originator, but it still appears at least as likely that she is not.
We use capital letters A, B to denote discrete random variables and the corresponding small
letters a, b and calligraphic lettersA, B for their values and set of values respectively. We denote
by P(a), P(b) the probabilities of a and b respectively and by P(a, b) their joint probability. The
conditional probability of a given b is defined as
P(a | b) =
P(a, b)
P(b)
.
Bayes Theorem relates the conditional probabilities P(a | b) and P(a | b) as follows
P(a | b) =
P(b | a) P(a)
P(b)
. (2)
Let n be the number of users participating in the protocol and let c and n − c be the number
of the corrupt and honest members, respectively. Since anonymity makes only sense for honest
users, we define the set of anonymous events as A = {a1, a2, . . . , an−c}, where ai indicates that
user i is the initiator of the message.
As it is usually the case in the analysis of C, We assume that attackers will always
deliver a request to forward immediately to the end server, since forwarding it any further cannot
help them learn anything more about the identity of the originator. Thus in any given path, there
is at most one detected user: the first honest member to forward the message to a corrupt member.
Therefore we define the set of observable events as O = {o1, o2, . . . , on−c}, where o j indicates that
user j forwarded a message to a corrupted user. In this case we also say that user j is detected by
the attacker.
Reiter and Rubin (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) formalise their notion of probable innocence via
the conditional probability that the initiator is detected given that any user is detected at all. This
property can be written in our setting as the probability that user i is detected given that she is
the initiator, that is the conditional probability P(oi | ai).
† Probable innocence holds if
∀i. P(oi | ai) ≤
1
2
(3)
† We are only interested in the case in which a user is detected, although for the sake of simplicity we shall not note
that condition explicitly.
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Reiter and Rubin proved in (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) that, in C, the following holds:
P(o j | ai) =

1 −
n − c − 1
n
p f i = j
1
n
p f i , j
(4)
Therefore, probable innocence (3) holds if and only if
n ≥
p f
p f − 1/2
(
c + 1
)
and p f ≥
1
2
As previously noticed in several papers (e.g., (Chatzikokolakis and Palamidessi, 2006)), there
is a mismatch between the idea of probable innocence expressed informally by (1), and the
property actually proved by Reiter and Rubin, viz. (3). The former seems indeed to correspond
to the following interpretation given by Halpern and O’Neill (Halpern and O’Neill, 2005):
∀i, j. P(ai | o j) ≤
1
2
. (5)
In turn, this has been criticised for relying on the probability of users’ actions, which the
protocol is not really in control of, and for being too strong. However, both (3) and (5) work
satisfactorily for C, thanks to its high symmetry: in fact, they coincide under its standard
assumption that the a priori distribution is uniform, i.e., that each honest user has equal proba-
bility of being the initiator, which we follow in this paper too.
We remark that the concept of probable innocence was recently generalised in (Hamadou et al.,
2009). Instead of just comparing the probability of being innocent with the probability of being
guilty, the paper focusses on the degree of innocence. Formally, given a real number α ∈ [0, 1], a
protocol satisfies α-probable innocence if and only if
∀i, j. P(ai | o j) ≤ α (6)
Clearly α-probable innocence coincides with standard probable innocence for α = 1/2.
3. Trust in C
In the previous section, we have revised the fundamental ideas of the C protocol and its
properties under the assumption that all members are deemed equal. However, as observed in §1,
this is clearly not a realistic assumption for today’s open and dynamic systems. Indeed, as shown
by the so-called ‘packet spinning’ attack (Pappas et al., 2008), malicious users can attempt to
make honest users select bogus routers by causing legitimate routers time out. The use attributes
relating to some level of trust is therefore pivotal to enhance the reliability of the system. In this
section, we firstly reformulate the C protocol under a novel scenario where the interaction
between participating users is governed by their level of mutual trust; we then evaluate its privacy
guarantees using property (6). We then focus on the analysis of attacks to the trust level of honest
users and their impact on the anonymity of the extended protocol. Finally, we investigate the
effect of a congestion attack (Evans et al., 2009) to the trust level of honest users.
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3.1. C extended
We now extend the C protocol to factor in a notion of trust for its participating members.
To this end, we associate a trust level ti j to each pair of users i and j, which represents user
i’s trust in user j. Accordingly, each user i defines her policy of forwarding to other members
(including herself) based on her trust in each of them. A policy of forwarding for user i is a
discrete probability distribution {qi1, qi2, · · · , qin}, where qi j denotes the probability that i chooses
j as the forwarder, once she has decided to forward the message.
A natural extension of C would obviously allow the initiator to select her first forwarder
according to her own policy, and then leave it to the forwarder to pick the next relay, according
to the forwarder’s policy. This would however have the counter-intuitive property that users may
take part in the path which are not trusted by the initiator, just because they are trusted by a
subsequent forwarder. We rather take the same view as most current systems, that the initiator
is in charge of selecting the entire path which will carry her transactions. In fact, this allows the
initiator to enhance both performance and privacy by routing messages through trusted peers,
which is the primary goal of adding a trust mechanism to anonymity protocols. When an initiator
wants to communicate with a server, she selects a random path through the crowd between herself
and the server by the following process.
— First forwarder: with probability qi j the initiator i selects a member j of the crowd (possibly
herself) according to her policy of forwarding {qi1, qi2, · · · , qin}.
— Subsequent forwarders: the initiator flips a biased coin; with probability 1 − p f the current
forwarder will be the last on the path, referred to as the path’s exit user. Otherwise, with
probability p f × qik, she selects k (possibly herself) as the next forwarder in the path; and so
on until a path’s exit user is reached.
The original C does not reveal to a(n adversary) router any information about a path,
apart from the previous and the next router; in particular, an adversary router does not learn how
far it sits from the message destination. Of course we need our extension to preserve this property,
as it makes traffic analysis substantially harder for the adversary. For this reason we resort to
a mechanism proposed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, 2005)
which was formally proved to enjoy this property. The idea is as follows. Once the initiator has
selected her random forwarders, she generates a session key for each of them. She then creates a
so-called onion. This is a data structure consisting of as many ‘layers’ as forwarders. The ith layer
contains the remaining part, say Oi, of the onion to be forwarded and the session key Ki of the i
th
forwarder, say Fi, encrypted with its public key. Once decrypted, the session key Ki allows Fi to
peels the topmost layer and discover the identity of next forwarder (if any). Importantly, Fi will
pad the resulting onion with as many bits as required to make Oi+1 of the same size as Oi. The
padding will be such that any deviation from these rules will be noticed at subsequent routers’
integrity check. This ensures that each intermediate forwarder Fi cannot assess its distance from
the exit router and from the initiator. For suitably long chains, this guarantees that intermediary
routers only know her immediate predecessor and successor. We refer the reader to (Camenisch
and Lysyanskaya, 2005) for a full description of the mechanism. To notify the initiator that the
path is fully created, the exit node (i.e., the last router on the path) sends an encrypted message
with her session key travelling back the path to the initiator.
Once the path is formed, messages from the initiator to the server are sent in the same way as
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in the normal C. Thus, all the nodes in the path have access to the contain of the message
and, obviously, to the end server. In particular, this means that the notion of detection remains
the same in the extended protocol as in the original one.
Adversary model. We assume here that users’ trust values are personal and private.‡ Hence, the
attackers have no knowledge of honest users’ forwarding policies. This implies that they have no
reasonable way to compute the probability P(o j | ai) of a specific user j being detected given that
user i initiates a transaction, or conversely the probability P(ai | o j) of a user i being the initiator
given that j is detected. These quantities are required by the probable innocence metrics (3) and
(5). Since building paths does reveals no additional information, the process gives attackers no
clear strategy to determine the most likely initiator. We therefore focus here on the typical (lazy)
adversaries which bet on what they have in hand, i.e. that the most likely initiator is the detected
user. We then evaluate the anonymity guaranteed to a user i by the probability that the attacker’s
guess is correct, that is the probability P(ai | oi).
Now we use our probabilistic framework to evaluate C extended protocol. We start by
evaluating the conditional probability P(o j | ai). Let ηi (resp. ζi = 1−ηi) be the overall probability
that user i chooses a honest (resp. corrupt) member as a forwarder. Then we have the following
result.
Proposition 1.
P
(
o j | ai
)
= ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
,
where ηi =
∑
k≤(n−c) qik, ζi =
∑
k≤c qik and ǫi j =
{
1 i = j
0 i , j
Proof. Let k denote the position occupied by the first honest user preceding an attacker on the
path, with the initiator occupying position zero. Let P(o j | ai)(k) denote the probability that user
j is detected exactly at position k. Only the initiator can be detected at position zero, and the
probability that this happens is equal to the overall probability that the initiator chooses a corrupt
member as a forwarder. Therefore
P
(
o j | ai
)
(0)
=
{
ζi i = j
0 i , j
Now the probability that j is detected at position k > 0 is given by
— the probability that she decides to forward k times and picks k − 1 honest users, i.e.,pk−1
f
ηk−1
i
(recall that at the initial step she does not flip the coin),
— times the probability of choosing j as the kth forwarder, i.e., qi j,
— times the probability that she picks any attacker at stage k + 1, i.e., ζip f .
‡ As this is one of the first papers (Johnson and Syverson, 2009; Sassone et al., 2010b; Johnson et al., 2011) on trust in
anonymity networks, we feel that such simplifying assumption is justified. The more general case where attackers can
attempt to infer honest users’ trust values will be investigated in future work. Note that compared with (Sassone et al.,
2010b) and our work, (Johnson and Syverson, 2009; Johnson et al., 2011) rely on a different notion of trust based on
‘difficulty-of-compromise’ rather than users’ performance, although still personal and private.
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Therefore
∀k ≥ 1, P
(
o j | ai
)
(k)
= ηk−1i p
k
f qi jζi
and hence
P
(
o j | ai
)
=
∞∑
k=0
P
(
o j | ai
)
(k)
= ζiǫi j +
∞∑
k=1
ηk−1i p
k
f qi jζi
= ζiǫi j +
∞∑
k=0
ηki p
k+1
f qi jζi
= ζiǫi j + p f qi jζi
∞∑
k=0
ηki p
k
f
= ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
.
An immediate consequence is that when user i initiates a transaction, user j is not detectable
if and only if the initiator’s policy of forwarding never chooses an attacker or j as forwarder.
Corollary 1. P(o j | ai) = 0 if and only if one of the following holds:
1 ζi = 0 ;
2 qi j = 0 and i , j.
Now, let us compute the probability of detecting a user P(o j). We assume a uniform distribu-
tion for anonymous events.
Proposition 2. If the honest members are equally likely to initiate a transaction, then
P(o j) =
1
n − c
(
ζ j +
∑
i≤(n−c)
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
)
,
where ζ j and ηi are defined as in Proposition 1.
Proof. Since the anonymous events are uniformly distributed then P(ai) = 1/(n − c) for all i.
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Thus
P(o j) =
∑
i≤(n−c)
P
(
o j | ai
)
P(ai)
=
∑
i≤(n−c)
P
(
o j | ai
) 1
n − c
=
1
n − c
∑
i≤(n−c)
P
(
o j | ai
)
=
1
n − c
∑
i≤(n−c)
(
ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
)
=
1
n − c
(
ζ j +
∑
i≤(n−c)
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
)
.
As one could expect, a user j is not detectable if both herself and any user i that might include
j in her path never choose a corrupted member as a forwarder. Formally:
Corollary 2. P(o j) = 0 if and only if
ζ j = 0 and ∀i. ( qi j = 0 or ζi = 0 ) .
Now from Propositions 1 and 2 and Bayes Theorem (2), we have the following expression for
the degree of anonymity provided by the extended protocol, which holds when P(o j) , 0.
Proposition 3. If the honest members are equally likely to initiate a transaction, then
P
(
ai | o j
)
=
ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
ζ j +
∑
k≤(n−c)
qk jζkp f
1 − ηkp f
,
where ζi and η j are defined as above.
It is now easy to see that if all honest users have uniform probability distributions as forwarding
policies, the extended protocol reduces to the original C protocol.
Corollary 3. If for all i and j, qi j = 1/n, then ηi = (n − c)/n and ζi = c/n. Therefore
P
(
ai | o j
)
=

1 −
n − c − 1
n
p f i = j
1
n
p f i , j
3.2. On the security of extended C
Here we show that the absence of a uniform forwarding policy makes it very hard to achieve
adequate anonymity protection both in the context of our “bet on the detected user” adversary
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model and the probable innocence as defined by Halpern and O’Neill (5). Indeed consider the
following instance of the protocol, where three honest users {1, 2, 3 } face a single attacker
{4}. Assume that the honest users are aware of the malicious behaviour of 4, and choose their
forwarding policies as follows: p f = 2/3, and q1 j = q2 j = 1/3, and q3 j = 0.33 for all j ≤ 3. In
other words, the first two choose uniformly any honest users as a forwarder and never pick the
attacker, whilst the third one may choose the attacker, though with a small probability q34 = 0.01.
Thus, ζ1 = ζ2 = q14 = q24 = 0 and ζ3 = q34 = 0.01. It follows that P(a3 | o3) = 1, and the instance
does not ensure anonymity to user 3, even though her policy is after all very similar to those
of the other honest users. This is because if someone is detected, then user 3 is necessarily the
initiator, as she is the only one who might possibly pick the attacker in her path.
Observe however that this instance of the protocol ensures probable innocence in Reiter and
Rubin’s formulation: indeed, P(oi | ai) < 0.0165 for all honest user i. The key difference at play
here is that Halpern and O’Neill’s definition is stronger, as it focuses on the probability that a
specific user is the initiator once somebody has been detected, regardless of the probability of the
detection event. On the other hand, Reiter and Rubin’s formula measures exactly (the conditional
probability of) the latter. This means that if the probability of detection is small, as in this case,
systems may be classified as statistically secure even when one such detection event may lead to
complete exposure for some initiators, as in this case.
On the other hand, Reiter and Rubin’s formulation, together with several other anonymity
measures (Syverson et al., 2001; Feigenbaum et al., 2007; Smith, 2009; Hamadou et al., 2010)
which take into account the probabilities of the observable events, show that the use of trust
hugely improves the anonymity of this simple instance of the C protocol, as the likelihood
of someone being detected is almost zero. To determine which metric is most appropriate is out of
the scope of this paper. Indeed, as we show below, attacks on trust levels could in fact (severely)
impact the anonymity of the protocol regardless of the metric used.
Attackings trust. As already observed by its authors, C is vulnerable to denial of service
(DoS) attacks: it is enough that a single malicious router delays her forwarding action to severely
hinder the viability of an entire path. This kind of attack is in fact hard for the initiator to respond
to. Just because the creation of multiple paths by any single user substantially increases their
security risk, the initiator has a strong incentive to keep using the degraded path. Indeed, it is
advisable in C to modify a path only when it has collapsed irremediably, e.g. due to a
system crash of a router, or their quitting the crowd. In this case the path is re-routed from
the node preceding the failed router. As a consequence, recent research has been devoted to
developing ‘trust metrics’ meant enhance the reliability of anonymity systems (Damiani et al.,
2002; Damiani et al., 2003; Singh and Liu, 2003).
Although the primary goal of incorporating trust in anonymity networks is to ‘enhance’ the
privacy guarantees by routing messages through trusted relays, preventing the presence of at-
tackers in forwarding paths is in itself not sufficient. External attackers may in fact target honest
users with DoS attacks independent of the protocol, to make them look unreliable and/or un-
stable. In this way, the target users will gradually loose others members’ trust, whilst internal
attackers may keep accruing good reputations. Thus, over the time the trust mechanisms may
become counterproductive.
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(a) i = j = 7 (b) i , j = 7
Fig. 2. C extended
Let us illustrate an attack of this kind. Consider an instance of the protocol where seven honest
users {1, 2, · · · , 7} face a single attacker {8}, assume that 7 is the honest user targeted by the
attack, and that all users are equally likely to initiate a transaction. Recall that a path in C
remains fixed for a certain amount of time –typically one day– known as a session. In practice,
all transactions initiated by a given user follow the same path, regardless of their destination
servers. At the end of the session then, all existing paths are destroyed, new members can join
the crowd, and each member willing to initiate anonymous transactions creates a new path. Trust
level updates play therefore their role at the beginning of each session. For the purpose of this
example, we assume that the protocol is equipped with mechanisms to detect unstable routers
(e.g., by monitoring loss of messages, timeouts, variations in response time and so on); upon
realising that her path is unstable, an initiator will notify all members of the identity of the
unstable node (in this case 7).§ When a node is reported as unstable, all other honest nodes
decrease their trust in her at the beginning of the following session. For simplicity, we assume
that all users start with the same trust level τ, and that the target user remains fixed over time.
The following policies of forwarding are therefore in place for each session, with n = 8, c = 1
and τ = 50.
q
(k)
i j
=

1
n
i = 7
τ − k
n × τ − k
i , 7 and j = 7
τ
n × τ − k
i , 7 and j , 7 .
In words, honest users other that the target decrease their trust in her by one and redistributed
it uniformly to the remaining users. On the other hand, the target has no reason to change her
trust, as there is no evidence to suspect anybody as the source of the external attack. Thus, her
policy remains the same over the time. Hence, we have
ζ
(k)
i
=

c
n
i = 7
τ
n × τ − k
otherwise.
§ This contrasts with the approach of (Dingledine and Syverson, 2002), where the initiator would directly decrease her
trust in all users in the path.
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Assuming that the forwarding probability is p f = 0.7, Figure 2 shows the probability that the
target will be identified over time. Clearly, the target’s privacy deteriorates quickly, as it becomes
increasingly unlikely that users other than herself pick her. In particular, after seven sessions the
protocol can no longer ensure adequate anonymity to user 7 as the probability P(a7 | o7) that the
attacker guess is correct becomes greater than 0.5.
4. Onion forwarding in C
In the previous section we analysed the privacy protection afforded by C extended with a
notion of trust. Following a similar pattern, in this section we focus on the privacy guarantees
offered by our protocol when equipped with ‘onion forwarding,’ a superior forwarding technique
used in systems actually deployed, such as Tor (Dingledine et al., 2004).
In C, any user participating in a path has access to the cleartext messages routed through
it. In particular, as all relay requests expose the message’s final destination, a team of attackers
will soon build up a host of observations suitable to classify the behaviour of honest participants.
We recently proved in (Hamadou et al., 2009) that such extra attackers’ knowledge makes it very
difficult to achieve anonymity in C. The most effective technique available against such a
risk is onion forwarding, originally used in the ‘Onion Routing’ protocol (Syverson et al., 1997),
and currently implemented widely in real-world systems. The idea is roughly as follows. The
session encryption keys established when forming a path (See Section 3.1) by the initiator , one
for each user in it, are used to repeatedly encrypt each message she routes through, starting with
the last node on the path, and ending with the first. Each intermediate user, in the act of receiving
the message decrypts it with her key. Doing so, she ‘peels’ away the outmost layer of encryption,
discovers who the next forwarder is, and relays the message as required. In particular, only the
last node sees the message in clear and learns its actual destination. Thus, a transaction is detected
only if the last user in the path, also known as the ‘exit node,’ is an attacker, and the last honest
user in the path is then detected.
4.1. Privacy level of the onion forwarding
Next we study the privacy ensured to each member participating in the protocol under the onion
forwarding scheme. As we did earlier, we begin with computing the conditional probability
P(o j | ai).
Proposition 4.
P
(
o j | ai
)
=
(1 − p f ) ζiǫi j
1 − ζip f
+
qi j ζip f
1 − ζip f
.
Proof. Let k denote the last position occupied by an honest user preceding an attacker on the
path, i.e., the position of the detected user. We denote by P(o j | ai)(k) the probability that user j is
detected exactly at position k. Again, only the initiator can be detected at position zero, and the
probability that this happens is equal to the overall probability that the initiator chooses a/some
corrupt members as forwarders, multiplied by the probability that the last corrupt member is the
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last node in the path. Therefore
P
(
o j | ai
)
(0)
=

∑∞
m=1 ζ
m
i
pm−1
f
(1 − p f ) i = j
0 i , j
(7)
=

(1−p f ) ζi
1−ζip f
i = j
0 i , j
Now the probability that j is detected at position k > 0 is given by
— the probability that she decides to forward k times and picks k − 1 users (does not matter
whether honest or not, as non-exit attackers cannot see the messages), i.e., pk−1
f
(recall that at
the initial step she does not flip the coin),
— times the probability of choosing j as the kth forwarder, i.e. qi j,
— times the probability that she picks any number k′ of attackers at the end of the path, i.e.∑∞
k′=1 p
k′
f
ζk
′
i
(1 − p f ).
Therefore
∀k ≥ 1, P
(
o j | ai
)
(k)
=
∞∑
k=1
(
pk−1f qi j
∞∑
k′=1
pk
′
f ζ
k′
i (1 − p f )
)
,
and hence
P
(
o j | ai
)
=
∞∑
k=0
P
(
o j | ai
)
(k)
=
(1 − p f )ζi
1 − ζip f
ǫi j +
∞∑
k=1
(
pk−1f qi j
∞∑
k′=1
pk
′
f ζ
k′
i (1 − p f )
)
=
(1 − p f )ζi
1 − ζip f
ǫi j + qi j(1 − p f )
∞∑
k=1
(
pk−1f
∞∑
k′=1
pk
′
f ζ
k′
i
)
=
(1 − p f )ζi
1 − ζip f
ǫi j + qi j(1 − p f )
∞∑
k=1
pk−1f
ζip f
1 − ζip f
=
(1 − p f )ζi
1 − ζip f
ǫi j +
qi j(1 − p f )ζip f
1 − ζip f
1
1 − p f
=
(1 − p f )ζi
1 − ζip f
ǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ζip f
.
Corollary 4. P(o j | ai) = 0 if and only if one of the following holds:
1 ζi = 0 ;
2 qi j = 0 and i , j.
Now on the probability of detecting a user P(o j). Assuming uniform distribution of anonymous
events we have the following result.
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Proposition 5. If the honest member are equally likely to initiate a transaction then.
P(o j) =
1
n − c
( (1 − p f )
1 − ζ jp f
ζ j +
∑
i≤(n−c)
qi j ζip f
1 − ζip f
)
.
Proof. Since the anonymous events are uniformly distributed then P(ai) = 1/(n − c) for all i.
Thus
P(o j) =
∑
i≤(n−c)
P
(
o j | ai
)
P(ai)
=
∑
i≤(n−c)
P
(
o j | ai
) 1
n − c
=
1
n − c
∑
i≤(n−c)
P
(
o j | ai
)
=
1
n − c
∑
i≤(n−c)
( (1 − p f )
1 − ζip f
ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ζip f
)
=
1
n − c
( (1 − p f )
1 − ζ jp f
ζ j +
∑
i≤(n−c)
qi jζip f
1 − ζip f
)
.
We then have the same conditions of non-detectability as in the previous section; that is, the
following result holds.
Corollary 5. P(o j) = 0 if and only if
ζ j = 0 and ∀i. ( qi j = 0 or ζi = 0 ) .
Now from Proposition 4 and 5 and the Bayes theorem, we have the following result.
Proposition 6. If the honest members are equally likely to initiate a transaction, then
P
(
ai | o j
)
=
ζi
1 − ζip f
ǫi j +
qi j ζi p f
(1 − p f )(1 − ζi p f )
ζ j
1 − ζ jp f
+
∑
k≤(n−c)
qk j ζk p f
(1 − p f )(1 − ζk p f )
.
Now from Propositions 3 and 6, we can prove effectively that the privacy level ensured by
the onion version is better than those offered by the versions where messages are forwarded in
cleartext. More formally, let
[
P(ai | o j)
]
CR
and
[
P(ai | o j)
]
OR
denote the probability that i is the
initiator given that j is detected under cleartext routing and onion routing, respectively. Then the
following holds, whose prove is simple and therefore omitted.
Theorem 1.
[
P(ai | oi)
]
OR
≤
[
P(ai | oi)
]
CR
, for all i.
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Fig. 3. Congestion attack
4.2. On the security of the onion forwarding version
As mentioned before, onion forwarding is the forwarding technique of choice in several real-
world systems. Recent work (Hopper et al., 2010; McLachlan and Hopper, 2008; McLachlan
et al., 2009; Murdoch and Danezis, 2005; Evans et al., 2009) shows that such systems are vulner-
able to so-called congestion attacks, which intuitively work as follows. Assume that the initiator
selects a path which contains a corrupt user as the exit node. The attacker can then observe the
pattern of arrival times of the initiator’s requests, and tries to identify the entire path by selec-
tively congesting the nodes she suspect to belong to it. Precisely, to determine whether or not a
specific node occurs in the path, she asks a collaborating attacker to build a long path looping on
the target node and ending with a corrupt node. Using this, the attacker perturbs the flow through
the target node, so that if the latter belongs also to the path under observation, the perturbation
will reflect at its exit node.
Here we use a variant of the congestion attack which, similarly to the previous section, allows
internal attackers to deteriorate the reputation of a targeted honest user, and does not require the
attacker to belong to a path. Figure 3 illustrates the attack, where a long path is built looping as
many times as possible over the target, preferably using different loops involving different users.
Thank to such properties, the target user will be significantly busy handling the same message
again and again, whilst no other member of the path will be congested.
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of this attack using the same example as in the cleartext for-
warding version in §3. The results are completely in tune with those presented by Figure 2: even
though the target node initially enjoys a better anonymity protection, her anonymity will unequiv-
ocally fall, although more smoothly than in §3. In particular, after twenty sessions, the protocol
no longer ensures adequate anonymity, as the probability of correctly gessing transactions of the
target node becomes greater than 0.5.
5. Adaptive attackers
We have worked so far under the assumption that protocol participants either behave always
honestly or always maliciously. Arguably, this is a rather unrealistic hypothesis in open and
dynamic systems, where honest nodes can become malicious upon being successfully attacked.
In this section we take the more realistic view that nodes may become corrupt, and study a new
kind of attackers, which we dub ‘adaptive,’ and the relative attacks.
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(a) i = j = 7 (b) i , j = 7
Fig. 4. Onion forwarding
Adaptive attackers differ from those we considered so far in the paper –and indeed from those
considered so far in the literature on C– in that when they intercept a message, rather
than just reporting its sender as the initiator, they attempt to travel the path back in order to
improve their chance to catch the actual originator. They do so by trying to corrupt the sender
of the message, say j1. If the attack succeeds, then the attacker effectively learns from j1 all
she needs to identify j1’s predecessor on the path, say j2, and repeat the adaptive attack on j2,
having moved a step closer to the initiator. The process is repeated iteratively until the attacker
either fails to corrupt the current node (or timeouts whilst trying to) or reaches the beginning of
the path. When that happens, the attacker reports the current node, say jk, which is obviously
a better candidate than j1 to have originated the transaction. Note that since a single node will
typically appear several times in a path, an adaptive attacker in her attempt to travel the path
backwards towards the initiator will in general meet each node several times. Thus, the attacker
has no need to corrupt the node again, and no new knowledge may be acquired by doing so.
We regard this as a significant and realistic kind of attack, as there clearly are a multitude of
ways in which the adaptive attacker may attempt to corrupt a node. These range from brute force
attacks via virus and worms which gains the attacker complete control over the node, to milder
approaches based on luring the target to give away some bit of information in exchange for some
form of benefit, and in general are entirely independent of the C protocol. We therefore do
not postulate here about the means which may be available to the attacker to carry out her task,
make no assumptions whatsoever about her power, and take the simplified view that each node
has at all time the same probability π to become corrupted.
In the rest of the section we re-evaluate the privacy guarantees afforded by C extended
–with and without onion forwarding– under this new adaptive attack scenario.
5.1. C extended
Our technical development proceedsmutatis mutandis as in §3 and §4. In particular, as before we
first evaluate the conditional probability P(o j | ai), then under the hypothesis that all honest users
are equally likely to initiate a transaction, we compute P(o j), and finally, using Bayes Theorem,
we obtain P(ai | o j).
Before computing these probabilities, we note that once a clever attacker successfully corrupts
a user, she will try to determine the first position of the victim in the path in order to jump to
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the later position and just avoid the (eventually) useless task of corrupting intermediary users
between positions of the same user.
Without onion routing, the attacker can send a message on the behalf of her victim to one of
the victim’s successors. If the message, which she can recognise because is sent in clear, is again
received by the victim, then she knows that both positions of the victim are on the same path.
By repeating the process with each successor, the attacker will determine the first position of the
victim on the targeted path.
Now, let H = {1, 2 . . . , n − c} denote the set of honest users, naturally ordered, and R ⊆ H
be the subset of honest users that the attacker has successfully corrupted in her backward attack.
Let R = H \ R be the complement of R and let ηi(J) =
∑
j∈J qi j be the overall probability that
user i chooses a member of J, for J a subset of H. We denote Perm(R) the set of permutations
of elements of R. Let σ be a permutation in Perm(R), and ρ (1 ≤ ρ ≤ |R|) a positive number. We
denote Rσ ⊕ ρ = R∪ {rσ(1), rσ(2) . . . , rσ(ρ)} the set of non-corrupted users augmented by the first ρ
members of the σ permutation, in increasing order (σ(i) ≤ σ( j) iff i ≤ j).
We observe that when the attackers successfully corrupted the initiator then there is only one
possible detection/observable as the initiator will be detected with probability one. The analysis
is therefore trivial. However, since our metric is conditioned by the observable events, we will
exclude this limit case and only consider the case of detections when the initiator is not cor-
rupted. Thus, we will say that a user is detected if she is the first user preceding an attacker or a
corrupted user and the attackers fail to corrupt her.
Let P(o j,R | ai)(k) denote the probability that j is detected at position k and that the attacker
successfully corrupted the honest users R in the path, given that i is the initiator.
For k ≥ 1, the initiator cannot be corrupt as we assume the attacker knows the first position of
her victim, and the initiator first position is k = 0. In this way, the attacker reports (i.e., detects) a
user at a position greater than zero if and only if she fails to corrupt her. The result is as follows.
Proposition 7. For all (non empty) strict subset R of H, for all i and j in R, and for all k ≥ 1, the
following holds.
P(o j,R | ai)(k) = η
k−1
i (R)p
k
f qi j(1 − π)
∑
σ∈Perm(R)
( |R|∏
ρ=1
φi(R, σ, ρ)
)
ζi
Where
φi(R, σ, ρ) = qirρ p fπ
(
1 +
qirρ p f
1 − ηi(Rσ ⊕ ρ)p f
)
Proof. Since j is detected at the position k, then all users occupying positions from zero to k
are not corrupt, i.e., they belong to the set R. Then
ηk−1i (R)p
k−1
f qi j(1 − π)
is the probability that the initiator i picks k − 1 users in R and then chooses the detected user j,
times the probability that the attacker fails to corrupt j. Also, φi(R, σ, ρ) represents the probability
that rσ(ρ), the currently under attack node, is a predecessor of a corrupted user, whose first position
on the path and the position where she is detected are separated by a finite number of users who
are so far not corrupted, i.e., those who belong to the set Rσ ⊕ ρ. The permutations are required
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science 21
since the corrupted elements R could be chosen by the initiator in any order. Therefore
φi(R, σ, ρ) = qirσ(ρ) p fπ
(
1 +
∞∑
k=0
ηki (Rσ ⊕ ρ)p
k+1
f qirσ(ρ)
)
= qirσ(ρ) p fπ
(
1 +
qirσ(ρ) p f
1 − ηi(Rσ ⊕ ρ)p f
)
Finally, ζi is the probability that an attacker belongs to the path.
We proceed now with the case when k = 0. If user j is detected at the first position, k = 0, then
j is actually the initiator. Since we exclude the case the initiator is corrupted then her immediate
successor is corrupted at any position k ≥ 1 and the attacker is not successful in corrupting the
initiator. Hence
P(oi,R | ai)(0) =
∑
σ∈Perm(R)
( |R|∏
ρ=1
φi(R, σ, ρ)
)
(1 − π)ζi
Thus we have the following.
Proposition 8. For all (non empty) strict subset R of H and for all i not in R, the following holds.
P(o j,R | ai)(0) =

∑
σ∈Perm(R)
∏|R|
ρ=1
φi(R, σ, ρ)(1 − π)ζi i = j and i < R
0 i , j
Note that the computations above are based on the assumption that the set R is not empty. How-
ever, it might be the case that the first corruption attempt fails. In this case, the probability of
detecting j when i initiates, is the same as without adaptive attackers, only weighted by the
probability of the first corruption attempt fails.
Proposition 9.
P(o j, ∅ | ai) = (1 − π)
(
ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
)
Now , from the results of Propositions 7, 8 and 9, we have:
Proposition 10.
P(o j | ai) = (1 − π)
∑
R⊆H\{i, j}
(
ǫi j +
qi jp f
1 − ηip f
)
Φi(R, σ, ρ)ζi
where
Φi(R, σ, ρ) =

1 if R = ∅
∑
σ∈Perm(R)
∏|R|
ρ=1
φi(R, σ, ρ) otherwise
Now it can be easily shown that the result above extend the non adaptive attacker since when
π = 0 we obtain the same result as in Proposition 1. In fact we have:
Corollary 6. If π = 0, then P(o j | ai) = ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1−ηip f
,
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The probabilities P(o j) and P(ai | o j) can be derived from the above result, as in the previous
sections, by computing P(o j) =
∑
k≤(n−c) P(o j | ak) and P(ai | o j) =
P(o j |ai)P(ai)
P(o j)
, assuming a
uniform a priori distribution, i.e P(ak) =
1
n−c
for all k. To keep the exposition simple, we do not
give here the formal expressions of these probabilities, but simply show how the result compare
to the case of non adaptive attackers. In particular the followings hold.
If the attacker is not adaptive then we obtain the same result as in Proposition 3.
Corollary 7. If π = 0, then
P
(
ai | o j
)
=
ζiǫi j +
qi jζip f
1 − ηip f
ζ j +
∑
k≤(n−c)
qk jζkp f
1 − ηkp f
If the attacker is too strong, e.g. a government forcing by law people involved in a suspicious
transaction to reveal their data, then the protocol cannot ensure any degree of anonymity. In fact
we have:
Corollary 8. If π = 1, then
P
(
ai | o j
)
=

1 i = j
0 i , j
Fig. 5. Privacy level P(ai|oi) under varying adaptive attack power π, for n = 7, c = 2, p f = 0.75.
To conclude this section, we illustrate how the protocol behaves in the presence of adaptive
attackers vs non adaptive attackers. Fig. 5 shows the privacy level P(ai | oi) of extended C
as π varies. Here, we set n = 7, c = 2, p f = 0.75 and let π range from 0 to 1. The probability
P(ai | oi) of adaptive attack increased from 0.5714 to 1. When the π equals 1, that is the attacker
can corrupt every node in the path, then the protocol is no secure. The probability P(ai | oi) for
non-adaptive attacks is constant at 0.5714, which is always smaller than in the case of adaptive
attack. Therefore, the protocol gets less secure as π increases.
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5.2. Onion forwarding
For onion forwarding, the attack in the previous section to identify the first position of a corrupted
user will clearly not work, as the attacker will not be able to recognise her own message, due to
encryption. However the attacker can still vary the delay of forwarding legitimate packets so as
to identify the victim’s positions which exhibit the same pattern of delay: the so called timing
attack (Hopper et al., 2010; Murdoch and Danezis, 2005; Wang et al., 2007). Repeating this
attack as much as possible will allow her to ultimately determine the first position of the victim
in the targeted path. Thus, we again assume that when an attacker successfully corrupts a user,
she knows the first position occupied by the victim. Another difference with the privious case is
that the attackers must appear as the last node on the path and there may be several attackers on
the path. Under this adaptive attack scenario, the attackers will firstly determine the first position
in the path containing an attacker, rather than start to corrupt nodes. They will then start the
adaptive attack with the predecessor of the malicious user closest to the initiator.
Now under these assumptions, the analysis is quite the same as in the previous section. The
only difference is that ζi, the overall probability of choosing an attacker, is replaced by Ti, the
probability that either choosing one attacker and then the path selection ends; or firstly choosing
an attacker node, then a finite number of users (honest users and attakers) and finally an attacker
as exit node. Hence
Ti =
[ ∞∑
m=0
p f ζi
(∑
j≤n
qmi jp
m
f
)
+ 1
]
p f ζi(1 − p f )
=
( ∞∑
m=0
p f ζi1
mpmf + 1
)
p f ζi(1 − p f )
= p f ζi(1 + p f ζi − p f ).
Using the notations introduced in the previous section, we have
Proposition 11.
P(o j | ai) = (1 − π)
∑
R⊆H\{i, j}
(
ǫi j +
qi jp f
1 − ηip f
)
Φi(R, σ, ρ)Ti
Unlike the results in the previous section, the case where π = 0 does not lead here to the same
results as for onion forwarding in the presence of non adaptive attackers. The reason is that the
adaptive attackers are stronger than their non-adaptive counterpart, even when π = 0. This is
because they will always proceed to determine the position of the first attacker on the path before
“betting on the detected user.” In particular the following holds.
Corollary 9. If π = 0, then P(o j | ai) =
(
ǫi j +
qi jp f
1 − ηip f
)
Ti.
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Corollary 10. If π = 0, then
P
(
ai | o j
)
=
(
ǫi j +
qi jp f
1 − ηip f
)
Ti
T j +
∑
k≤(n−c)
qk jp f
1 − ηkp f
Tk
.
Observe that for a very strong attacker, we have zero level of anonymity.
Corollary 11. If π = 1, then
P
(
ai | o j
)
=

1 i = j
0 i , j .
To conclude this section, we observe that the gain, in term of security, obtained by onion forward-
ing in the case of non-adaptive adversaries (see Theorem 1), might be offset by the vulnerability
of the protocol to the timing attack in the presence of adaptive attackers. In particular, when
π = 0, that is the attackers cannot corrupt honest users, and each honest user has the same value
Ti = T , which holds if and only if each of them has the same overall probability of picking an
adversary, i.e. ζi = ζ j for all i and j, then we have the following result.
Corollary 12. If π = 0 and ζi = ζ j, for all i and j, then[
P(ai | oi)
]
OR
≤
[
P(ai | oi)
]
CR
=
[
P(ai | oi)
]
CR Adapt
=
[
P(ai | oi)
]
OR Adapt
for all i.
Where CR Adapt and OR Adapt stand for the context of cleartext and onion routing in the pres-
ence of adaptive attackers respectively and CR and OR as in Theorem 1. However had we ex-
pressed the security of the protocol via the conditional probability P
(
oi | ai
)
a la Reiter and
Rubin probable innocence (Reiter and Rubin, 1998) then from Proposition 10 and 11, it is easy
to observe that onion routing is more secure than its cleartext routing counterpart since Ti ≤ 1.
Corollary 13. P
[
(oi | ai)
]
OR Adapt
≤ P
[
(oi | ai)
]
CR Adapt
, for all i.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an enhancement of the C anonymity protocol via a notion
of trust which allows crowd members to route their traffic according to their perceived degree
of trustworthiness of each other member of the crowd. Such trust relations are not simply meant
to reflect an immutable web of trust; rather, they represent mutable values meant to quantify
the individual level of expectation that crowd members have in obtaining a satisfactory service
from each other. In particular, they express a measure of an individual’s belief that another user
may become compromised by an attacker, either by a direct attempt to corrupt or by a denial-of-
service attack.
We formalised our ideas of trust-driven routing quite simply by means of (variable) forwarding
policies, with and without onion forwarding techniques. Our protocol variation has the potential
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of improving the overall trustworthiness of data exchanges in anonymity networks, which can-
not normally be taken for granted in a context where users are actively trying to conceal their
identities.
Using such formalisation, in the paeper we then analysed quantitatively the privacy properties
of the protocol, both for C and onion forwarding, under standard and adaptive attacks.
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